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ABSTRACT
Graph theoretic modeling has served as an invaluable tool for solving a variety of
problems since its introduction in Euler’s paper on the Bridges of Königsberg in 1736 [1]. Two
amongst them of contemporary interest are the modeling of Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive
Disks (RAID), and the identification of network attacks. While the former is vital to the
protection and uninterrupted availability of data, the latter is crucial to the integrity of systems
comprising networks. Both are of practical importance due to the continuing growth of data and
its demand at increasing numbers of geographically distributed locations through the use of
networks such as the Internet.
The popularity of RAID has soared because of the enhanced I/O bandwidths and large
capacities they offer at low cost. However, the demand for bigger capacities has led to the use of
larger arrays with increased probability of random disk failures. This has motivated the need for
RAID systems to tolerate two or more disk failures, without sacrificing performance or storage
space. To this end, we shall first perform a comparative study of the existing techniques that
achieve this objective. Next, we shall devise novel graph-theoretic algorithms for placing data
and parity in arrays of n disks (n ≥ 3) that can recover from two random disk failures, for n = p –
1, n = p and n = 2p – 2, where p is a prime number. Each shall be shown to utilize an optimal
ratio of space for storing parity. We shall also show how to extend the algorithms to arrays with
an arbitrary number of disks, albeit with non-optimal values for the aforementioned ratio.
The growth of the Internet has led to the increased proliferation of malignant applications
seeking to breach the security of networked systems. Hence, considerable effort has been
focused on detecting and predicting the attacks they perpetrate. However, the enormity of the
ii

Internet poses a challenge to representing and analyzing them by using scalable models.
Furthermore, forecasting the systems that they are likely to exploit in the future is difficult due to
the unavailability of complete information on network vulnerabilities. We shall present a
technique that identifies attacks on large networks using a scalable model, while filtering for
false positives and negatives. Furthermore, it also forecasts the propagation of security failures
proliferated by attacks over time and their likely targets in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
From its inception, graph theory has proved invaluable in modeling numerous problems
and deriving their solutions. Two contemporary ones of practical interest are the design of
Redundant Arrays of Independent Disks (RAID) and, the identification of network attacks and
the forecasting of their propagation.
1.1 A case for RAID tolerant to two or more random disk failures
In contrast to the growth of CPU throughputs, enhancements to I/O bandwidth have been
relatively modest. In fact, I/O limitations continue to bottleneck the performance of many
applications to this day. This fact motivated the introduction of Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive
Disks (RAID) [14, 32, 33] that substitutes large expensive disks with arrays of independent disks
to provide greater effective I/O bandwidth. Note that, the word independent in RAID may be
found substituted by inexpensive in literature on this area. However, an array’s probability of
failure exceeds that of each disk comprising it. Consider the disks that are manufactured with
some of the most stringent requirements on durability, such as those with SCSI and Fibre
Channel interfaces. They have mean time between failures (MTBF) of at most 1,400,000 hours.
Manufacturers list the MTBF of a disk to be nh hours if, upon running an array of n such disks,
the first disk fails after h hours. Thus, if an array is comprised of 1024 disks, with each having an
MTBF of 1,400,000 hours, one disk may be expected to fail approximately every 57 days.
However, this is a misleading measure of reliability for several reasons. First, such tests use disks
with pristine electromechanical components that, unlike in older disks, have not degraded due to
overheating, vibration, and shock from rough handling. Second, a large number of disks, such as
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those with ATA and SATA interfaces, utilize less resilient components than SCSI and Fibre
Channel ones to reduce cost. Hence, arrays comprised of such disks are likely to experience
failures sooner than equal sized ones with more robust disks.
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Figure 1: RAID level 0 with n disks and m blocks per disk.

A RAID level 0 with n disks may partition each disk into equal sized blocks and order the
blocks in a round-robin fashion. This enhances I/O throughput by permitting up to n blocks to be
accessed concurrently when reading from, or writing to the array sequentially. Figure 1 displays
the order of the data blocks in a RAID level 0 with n disks and m data blocks per disk. But,
RAID level 0 does not offer any redundancy. In contrast, levels 1 through 5 provide tolerance to
the failure of exactly one disk in the array. RAID level 1 is simply a pair of disks with the data
on any one being mirrored on the other, and RAID level 5 consists of at least three disks with
rotating bit-wise parity placement to provide redundancy.
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Figure 2: A RAID level 10 with three virtual disks, each being a RAID 1.

Since RAID levels 1 through 5 can tolerate only one disk failure, their use is limited to
small arrays where the probability of a second disk failing before a previously failed disk has
been reconstructed, is negligible. A popular technique that addresses this challenge partitions a
set of disks into subsets, with each being a single-disk fault-tolerant RAID that is treated as a
disk. However, the likelihood of this event is greater for larger arrays. We note that, arrays with
over 1000 disks are already offered by vendors such as Hewlett Packard, Hitachi and EMC. Such
arrays may need to tolerate two or more simultaneous disk failures. For example, RAID Level 10
is obtained in this manner by treating subsets of RAID Level 1 as disks. Figure 2 displays a
RAID Level 10 composed of three subsets of RAID Level 1. The blocks in the array are
represented by cylindrical segments, with their typical size in practice being 128 KB. Their
labels indicate the sequential order in which data is written to them, with identically labeled
blocks containing duplicate data.
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Although such arrays can tolerate as many disk failures as there are subsets, each failure
is restricted to a unique subset. Thus, there is a compelling need for arrays that can tolerate
multiple arbitrary disk failures. For most practical array sizes, the probability of occurrence of
more than two simultaneous disk failures is generally small enough to be ignored, and a lesser
number of failures can be tackled by the use of RAID systems resistant to two disk failures.
1.2 A case for attack graphs
The rapid growth of the Internet has triggered an explosion in the number and use of
networked applications. Unfortunately, many are maliciously designed to harm network
infrastructure and systems. Hence, considerable effort has been focused on detecting and
predicting the breaches in security produced by them. However, the enormity of the Internet
poses a formidable challenge to representing and analyzing such attacks using scalable models.
Furthermore, the unavailability of complete information on network vulnerabilities makes the
task of forecasting the systems that are likely to be exploited by such applications in the future
equally hard.
Directed graphs serve as an intuitive way to represent network attacks. Existing
formulations [35, 37, 39] use vertices to represent a tuple of attributes comprised of a source
system, target system, a vulnerability that exists on the target as a precondition, and the
postcondition of an atomic attack from the source to the target using that vulnerability. Then, an
arc exists from one exploit to another if and only if an atomic attack can leverage the
postcondition in the former to utilize the precondition in the latter, and the corresponding
systems are connected. To produce such attack graphs, the set of vulnerabilities at each system in
the network is first obtained using scanners such as Nessus, Saint, ISS’ Internet Scanner and the
4

CISCO Security Scanner. Then, a model checker such as NuSMV or Spin is applied to a graph
on all possible exploits to generate every path that breaches an explicitly stated security
condition that is stated as the goal. Finally, the result produced by the model checker is rendered
using a visualization application such as GraphViz. However, such attack graphs suffer from two
major drawbacks. First, they have very large orders and lack scalability. As a result, they cannot
be used to model and visualize attacks on networks in practice. To alleviate the severity of this
problem, mechanisms have been proposed to reduce the order of such graphs [3] and to represent
them succinctly to facilitate their comprehension by users [27, 29]. Second, a given graph
describes the attack paths comprised of sequences of exploits that breach a target security
condition, and therefore, its use is confined to the analysis of attacks pertaining to the violation
of that condition alone. To address this challenge, attack graphs have been constructed using a
large set of attack goals [30].
However, attack graphs merely provide a roadmap of the attacks that can occur based on
the vulnerabilities exposed by the systems under consideration. In isolation, they cannot establish
if an exploit corresponding to an intrusion detection system (IDS) alert truly constitutes an
attack. There are various reasons that can make this determination difficult. Firstly, any given
network-based IDS incorporates rules that are designed to search the payload of network packets
for signatures that portend threat and generates an alert when a match is found. However, such
rules are independent of the potentially differing sets of vulnerabilities admitted by various hosts
on that network. That is, the payload of a packet arriving at a system may ostensibly exploit a
vulnerability v, but that system may not admit v. For example, the Lion worm exploits
vulnerabilities in Linux only. However, a typical IDS generates an alert even when this worm
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attempts to exploit a Windows-based system. However, such an exploit is guaranteed to have no
ill effect on a targeted Windows system nor serve as an intermediate step towards harming any
peers, and is therefore defined to be irrelevant. Secondly, an event by itself may have ambiguous
implications. For example, a TCP-SYN packet received by a host may be a legitimate request by
a client to open a streaming connection to that host, or it may constitute a deliberate TCP-SYN
flooding being carried out by that client using spoofed IP addresses to achieve denial of service.
An alert generated in response to the occurrence of the former event, termed as a false positive,
is undesirable since they drain network administration resources away from the investigation of
meaningful events. While methods to identify false positives such as TCP-SYN flooding already
exist, they are based on time-consuming heuristics that track the activity of malicious clients
over periodic intervals of time [38]. Thirdly, an event may be incorrectly judged to be benign.
For example, an ftp request that appears to originate from a trusted system within a firewall to a
peer within it may be considered harmless, and therefore, ignored by the existing set of IDS
rules. However, in reality the actual source may reside outside the firewall, and the system
appearing to initiate the ftp request may have been compromised earlier to allow a portforwarding program on it to masquerade as the source. The lack of an alert in such an instance is
termed as a false negative and it poses a far greater danger to the network than false positive or
irrelevant alerts. It is therefore vital to correlate alerts to meaningfully identify attacks.

6

2. A SURVEY
2.1 Salient methods to realize RAID tolerant to two or more random disk failures
Several schemes to recover from random two-disk failures have been developed, each
with their advantages and disadvantages. Blaum’s technique for recovery against double disk
failures [6] uses bit-wise exclusive-OR (XOR) of data blocks to calculate parity, and stores it
using an optimal fraction of the total space of the array. However, it requires the array size to be
a prime number. This is commercially unappealing since consumers typically demand
considerable flexibility in choosing the size of the array that meets the needs of their respective
businesses.
The EVENODD scheme [7] requires the array to have (p + 2) disks, where p is a prime
number. Data is stored exclusively on p disks while parity is stored on the remaining two disks.
This scheme allows non-prime values for the number of data disks n by assuming the presence of
(p – n) additional imaginary data disks in the array containing 0’s. This scheme too, uses bit-wise
XOR of data blocks to calculate parity, and stores it using an optimal fraction of the total space
of the array. However, it stores parities exclusively on two disks. This chokes throughput when
writing to the array since parity updates are confined to two disks. Furthermore, read throughput
from the array does not utilize the cumulative I/O bandwidth of all disks since the two parity
disks do not contain any data to be read.
Similarly, the RDP scheme [9] requires the array to have (p + 1) disks, where p is a prime
number. Data is stored exclusively on (p – 1) disks while parity is stored on the remaining two
disks. As in the EVENODD scheme, RDP allows values for the number of data disks n not equal
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to (p – 1) by assuming the presence of (p – 1 – n) additional imaginary data disks in the array
containing 0’s. RDP too, uses bit-wise XOR of data blocks to calculate parity, and stores it using
an optimal fraction of the total space of the array. Unfortunately, it too, stores parities
exclusively on two disks that stifles read and write throughput.
The X-code scheme [43] requires the array to have p disks, where p is a prime number. It
distributes parity over all the disks enabling efficient disk utilization. However, its requirement
on the number of disks in the array being equal to a prime number makes it commercially
undesirable.
The B-code scheme [44] describes the methods for the placement of data and parity in
arrays with p and (2p – 1) disks by deriving the desired maximum distance separable B-codes
from the equivalent perfect 1-factorizations of the complete graphs Kp + 1 and K2p.
The STAR code [13] is an extension of the EVENODD scheme that enables arrays
having (p + 3) disks, where p is a prime number, to recover from up to three random disk
failures. As in the case of EVENODD, it places parity exclusively in three disks, and thus suffers
from the same I/O inefficiency as its predecessor.
Techniques based on Reed-Solomon codes [36] such as DATUM [2] allow arbitrary
array sizes. However, their use of Galois Field arithmetic to compute parities makes them
computationally more expensive than those using only XOR operations as demonstrated by
projects such as Oceanstore [17]. Hence, they are implemented using costly specialized hardware
that makes the solution economically unattractive.
Park’s RM2 algorithm [31] determines the configuration of data and parity, when given
the desired number of disks n in the array and the ratio of disk space r used for storing parity.

8

However, the algorithm does not guarantee a solution for all values of r and n. As a result, for a
given value of n, several values of r may have to be tested, other than the optimal value of 2/n, in
decreasing order of optimality to find one for which the algorithm can yield the placement of
data and parity that can tolerate the failure of two random disks. The only known enhancement to
RM2 [21] has unfortunately only addressed the low write I/O performance in arrays tolerant to
two disk failures. This shortcoming arises from the need to update two distinct parity blocks
whenever a block of data is written into such arrays.
Our research proposes to address the various drawbacks observed in the aforementioned
schemes. To that end, our schemes attempt to meet the following requirements.


Parities are computed using computationally less expensive XOR operations only.



Parities are distributed evenly over all disks to enhance data throughput.



Space consumed for storing parity is optimal.



Arrays can be comprised of an arbitrary number of disks.
2.2 Salient methods to analyze and forecast network attacks
A number of methods have been proposed to meaningfully correlate alerts with attacks.

One salient approach [40] fuses together alerts that are generated within a finite window of time
and possess common values for a specified set of attributes to form a meta-alert. However, the
drawback of this technique is that it can fuse together uncorrelated alerts when they have
common attributes such as source and destination addresses, and can ignore related alerts that are
spaced farther apart in time. Furthermore, it fuses meta-alerts constituting multi-step attacks in a
similar manner with the same deficiencies.

9

Another technique [30] creates paths comprised of observed events such that, each
contains events whose corresponding exploits in the attack graph have a distance less than a
specific threshold to other exploits whose corresponding events lie on the same path. The
relevancy of a path to an attack is then obtained by first applying a moving average filter to the
distances between the adjacent events in each path, and then calculating the ratio of the number
of events in a given path to the sum of the filtered distances between all pairs of events in that
path. The drawback of this scheme is that, it uses conventional non-aggregated attack graphs,
which as stated earlier, have extremely large orders, which makes distance calculation between
alerts computationally nontrivial.
Several methods have also been proposed to estimate the likelihood of an attack with
specified goals. One prominent scheme [10] accomplishes this by modeling attacks using trees
where each vertex represents a network/attacker state and each edge represents an exploit that
leverages a non-unique vulnerability with a given probability. The probability of the goal state is
defined to be the sum of the probabilities of each non-intersecting path that has the vertex
representing that goal state as an end, where the probability of each path is the product of the
probabilities of the edges comprising it. However, it does not address the mechanism by which
the probability of an exploit can be derived.
Another technique [28] computes the closure of the adjacency matrix A of the vertices of
an attack graph, where Ak shows the clusters of systems that are at risk from one another after k
attack steps. However, this indicates the reachability of an attack initiated from a given system to
others in the network and not necessarily the path that is taken by an attack.
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3. MODELING RAID TO TOLERATE TWO RANDOM DISK FAILURES
The graph theoretic schemes we have developed to model the placement of data and
parity in disk arrays have several advantages over the schemes investigated in our survey. First,
the computational expense incurred by our schemes for deriving parities and reconstructing
failed disks is relatively low. This is because they use XOR operations only to calculate parity.
Second, they distribute parity uniformly over all the disks, permitting data to be read from, and
parity to be written to all disks concurrently. This enhances I/O throughput of the array. Finally,
the arrays to which our schemes can collectively be applied have disk numbers encompassing a
relatively dense subset of the set of integers, while consuming an optimal ratio of space for
storing parity. In each scheme, the fault-tolerant array is modeled as a graph G = (V, E) with a
self-loop at each vertex, where each disk corresponds to a unique vertex in V, each data block
corresponds to a simple edge in E, and each parity block corresponds to a self-loop.
3.1 Approach using complete graphs
Two graph-theoretic algorithms for arrays of n disks, n ≥ 4, that can recover from the
failure of any two arbitrary disks have been proposed [11, 12]. The first has n = p – 1, and the
second n = 2p – 2, where p is a prime number. Both algorithms generate solutions with at most
(n/2 – 1) equal sized blocks of data and exactly one block of parity per disk. Each parity block’s
value is then obtained by computing the bit-wise XOR of data blocks specified by the respective
algorithm. In practice, the solutions repeat the configuration of the data and parity blocks an
integral number of times.
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3.1.1 Using Kp, where p is a prime number, to model arrays with (p – 1) disks
Given p a prime number, this scheme admits arrays with (p – 1) disks having (p – 3)/2
equal sized blocks of data and one block of parity per disk. Each data block is labeled {u, v}, 0 ≤
u, v ≤ p – 1, u ≠ v, and its contents used for computing the bit-wise parity stored in the parity
blocks labeled {u, u} and {v, v}. Thus, the parity in the block labeled {v, v} equals the bit-wise
XOR of the data in each data block labeled using v. Also, the parity-block in disk d is labeled {d,
d}. For brevity, a block labeled {u, v} is hereafter referred to as, block {u, v}.

{3, 4}

{0, 2}

{1, 3}

{2, 4}

{0, 1}

{0, 3}

{2, 5}

{4, 5}

{0, 4}

{1, 5}

{3, 5}

{1, 2}

{0, 0}

{1, 1}

{2, 2}

{3, 3}

{4, 4}

{5, 5}

Figure 3: A 6-disk array modeled using K7.

Consider the array of six disks shown in Figure 3. In this array, each parity-block {d, d}
contains the bit-wise XOR of all data-blocks labeled using d, where 0 ≤ d ≤ p – 2. For instance,
the parity in the block {3, 3} equals the bit-wise XOR of the data in blocks {3, 4}, {1, 3}, {3, 5}
and {0, 3}. This array can tolerate two random disk failures. For example, if disks 0 and 2 say
fail, then we can reconstruct them as follows. We can first reconstruct the block {1, 3} on disk 2
because no other blocks labeled using 1 are on the failed disks. Therefore, its content can be
derived by taking the bit-wise XOR of the blocks {1, 1}, {1, 5}, {0, 1} and {1, 2}. Next, we can
reconstruct the block {3, 4} on disk 0 because all other blocks labeled using 3 have been already
reconstructed or lie on disks that are intact. Similarly, we can then reconstruct the block {0, 4}
12

followed by the block {0, 0}. In the aforesaid sequence of reconstructed blocks {1, 3}, {3, 4},
{0, 4} and {0, 0}, each block’s label, other than that of the first, has an element in common with
the label of the previously reconstructed block. However, we cannot reconstruct any farther in
this manner because no unreconstructed blocks labeled using 0 remain on the failed disks. Next,
we can reconstruct the remaining blocks on disks 0 and 2 as follows. We reconstruct the block
{2, 5} because no other blocks labeled using 5 are on the failed disks. Hence, its content can be
derived from the bit-wise XOR of the blocks {4, 5}, {1, 5}, {3, 5} and {5, 5}. Finally, we can
reconstruct the block {2, 2}.

0
0
1
2
4

2

1

3

3
6
0
3

5

2
2

6

1

4

4
4

0

1

3
6

Figure 4: The graph G(V, E) that models the six-disk RAID.
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The array shown in Figure 3 is modeled by the graph G(V, E) shown in Figure 4. Each
data-block {u, v} in the array corresponds to the edge (u, v) in E. Thus, each parity-block {v, v}
corresponds to the self-loop (v, v). Note that, all the edges and self-loops in E are colored, with
the blocks corresponding to identically colored edges being on the same disk. For example, the
blocks in the array corresponding to edges (3, 4), (2, 5) and (0, 0), each colored 0, are all on the
leftmost disk.
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5
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5
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1

Figure 5: The graph Q7 with its edges colored to yield a perfect near-1-factorization.

G is obtained from the complete graph K7 in the following manner. First, a self-loop is
added to each vertex of K7 to yield the graph Q7. Next, the edges of Q7 are colored to produce a
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perfect near-1-factorization. A near-1-factor of a graph G is a spanning subgraph of G in which
one vertex is isolated and all others have degree 1. (Note that the order of G must then be odd.) A
perfect near-1-factorization of G is a partitioning of its edges into near-1-factors such that the
union of any two near-1-factors induces a Hamiltonian path in G. Now, Q7 admits such a
coloring, as shown in Figure 5, since any complete graph of prime order admits a perfect near-1factorization [4]. One such coloring is where edge (u, v) is colored u + v (mod p). Let Ф be the
set of seven near-1-factors and their associated self-loops in Q7. Finally, from Q7 we remove
vertex 6, the edges incident on vertex 6, and all the edges of the near-1-factor colored the same
as the self-loop on vertex 6.
The result of removing vertex 6 and the edges incident on it from Q7 results in each of the
remaining six near-1-factors in Ф losing their respective edge incident on vertex 6 to yield a set
of six matchings П. Each matching corresponds to a disk, each edge (u, v) in a matching
represents the data block {u, v} in the corresponding disk, and each self-loop (v, v) associated
with a matching, represents the parity-block {v, v} in the disk corresponding to that matching.
Now, suppose two disks have failed in the array. Then, we can reconstruct the data blocks
in those disks as follows. Select an edge (u, v) in a near-1-factor in Ф corresponding to a failed
disk such that u is adjacent to the vertex in W in the near-1-factor corresponding to the other
failed disk. Then, no edge other than (u, v) in the two matchings in П corresponding to the failed
disks can be incident to the vertex u. Hence, there is no data block other than {u, v} in the two
failed disks that contributes to the contents of the parity-block {u, u}. Furthermore, the parityblock {u, u} cannot be on either failed disk for the following reason. Parity-blocks correspond to
self-loops, and self-loops are on the ends of the Hamiltonian path formed by the edges in the
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union of any pair of near-1-factors in Ф. If the parity-block {u, u} were on a failed disk, u would
be an end of the Hamiltonian path formed by the edges in the near-1-factors in Ф corresponding
to the failed disks. This would be a contradiction, since by assumption (u, v) is an edge.
Thus, we can reconstruct the data block {u, v} by taking the XOR of the data in all blocks
labeled using u. We can then reconstruct a data block labeled using v, {v, w} say, by taking the
XOR of the data in all blocks labeled using v. This is possible because a pair of disks can have at
most two data blocks that contribute to the contents of any given parity-block. Next, we can
reconstruct a data block labeled using w different from {v, w}. Thus, in each iteration we select a
data block for reconstruction whose label shares a common element with the label of the data
block reconstructed in the previous iteration. Thus, a data block {u, v} can be reconstructed if the
edge (u, v) is on a path comprised of the edges in the matchings in П corresponding to the failed
disks, and the path has an end x, with x adjacent to vertex 6 in the corresponding near-1-factor in
Ф. Since the edges corresponding to the data-blocks of two failed disks form a Hamiltonian path
minus those edges incident to vertex 6, each edge is therefore on a path having an end that is
adjacent to vertex 6. Hence, we can reconstruct each and every data block on a pair of failed
disks.
Since a graph with prime order admits a perfect near-1-factorization, the steps involved in
the modeling of the six disk RAID can be generalized using the complete graph on p vertices Kp,
to yield a (p – 1) disk RAID, where p is a prime number. Figure 6 illustrates the algorithm that
may be used to this end, while Figure 26 in Appendix A describes the algorithm for
reconstructing a pair of failed disks in such an array.
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for u ← 0 to (P – 1) do
for v ← u to (P – 1) do
Color (u, v) with c(u, v) ← (u + v) mod p
endfor
endfor
Let W be a singleton subset of V
for each disk d in V – W do
b←0
for u ← 0 to (p – 2) do
for v ← (u + 1) to (p – 1) do
if (u  V – W) and (v  V – W) and (c(u, v) = c(d, d)) then
Block b in disk d is assigned the data-block label {u, v}
b←b+1
endif
endfor
endfor
Block b of disk d is assigned the parity-block label {d, d}
endfor
Figure 6: Algorithm to place data and parity blocks in a (p – 1) disk array

Data may be requested from arrays with a pair of failed disks that have not been
reconstructed. To minimize the number of blocks reconstructed prior to the one containing the
desired data, it is necessary to find the sequence of blocks containing that block. There are only
two sequences of data blocks comprising a pair of disks, with each sequence starting on a unique
disk. Hence it suffices to find the disk on which the desired reconstruction sequence starts. To
this end, Figure 28 in Appendix B describes the algorithm to find the disk from which to start
reconstruction.
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3.1.2 Using K2p – 1 to model arrays with (2p – 2) disks
The preceding result demonstrates how any complete graph with a self-loop at each
vertex models the placement of data and parity in a two-disk fault tolerant array if it admits a
perfect near-1-factorization. This is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Qm be the graph formed by adding a self-loop at each vertex of Km. If Km admits
a perfect near-1-factorization, then Qm models the placement of data and parity in an array of (m
– 1) disks to tolerate two random disk failures.
Perfect 1-factorizations of K2p have been given by Anderson [4] and Nakamura in
Japanese [15]. Nakamura defines a 1-factor of K2p = (V, E) where V = {0, 1, …, 2p – 1} with
edges colored c as,

{(i, j ) | i  j  c (mod 2 p)}  {( 2c , 2c  p)},
Fc  
{(i, j ) | i is odd and i  j  c (mod 2 p)} ,

if c is even
if c is odd and c  p

The (2p – 1) 1-factors defined by this construction have 2p edges each. Now, we remove
vertex (2p – 1) and all edges incident to it from K2p to obtain (2p – 1) near-1-factors of K2p – 1,
each having (2p – 1) edges. The union of the edges of any pair of these near-1-factors must form
a Hamiltonian path. Next, we add a self-loop at each vertex of K2p

– 1

to obtain Q2p

– 1.

By

Theorem 1, Q2p – 1 must model the placement of data and parity in an array of (2p – 2) disks to
tolerate two disk failures using an optimal ratio of space for parity. Using Q2p – 1, we place data
and parity in an array of (2p – 2) disks as described by the algorithm in Figure 7.
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Step 1:

for u ← 0 to (2p – 3) do
for v ← (u + 1) to (2p – 2) do
if (u + p = v) then
Color (u, v) with c(u, v) ← 2u (mod 2p)
else if (u + v ≡ 0 (mod 2)) then
Color (u, v) with c(u, v) ← u + v (mod 2p)
else if (u ≡ 1 (mod 2)) then
Color (u, v) with c(u, v) ← u – v (mod 2p)
else
Color (u, v) with c(u, v) ← v – u (mod 2p)
endif
end for
end for

Step 2:

for u ← 0 to (2p – 2) do
S ← {0, …, p – 1, p + 1, …, 2p – 1}
for v ← 0 to (2p – 2) do
if ( u ≠ v ) then
S ← S – c(u, v)
end if
end for
k←0
while (k ≤ (2p – 2) and k  S) do
k←k+1
end while
Color (u, u) with c(u, u) ← k
end for

Step 3:

Let W be a singleton subset of V

Step 4:

for each disk d in V – W do
b←0
for u ← 0 to (2p – 3) do
for v ← (u + 1) to (2p – 2) do
if u  V – W and v  V – W and c(u, v) = c(d, d) then
Label data-block b in d as {u, v}
b←b+1
end if
end for
end for
Label parity-block b in d as {d, d}
end for

Figure 7: Algorithm to model a (2p – 2) disk array that tolerates two disk failures.
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As an example, the eight-disk array with data and parity assignments obtained upon
executing the given algorithm using W = {8} is shown in Figure 8.

{1, 2}

{0, 5}

{0, 7}

{0, 2}

{1, 7}

{0, 4}

{0, 3}

{0, 6}

{3, 4}

{3, 7}

{1, 4}

{1, 6}

{2, 6}

{1, 3}

{2, 5}

{1, 5}

{5, 6}

{4, 6}

{3, 6}

{5, 7}

{3, 5}

{2, 7}

{4, 7}

{2, 4}

{0, 0}

{1, 1}

{2, 2}

{3, 3}

{4, 4}

{5, 5}

{6, 6}

{7, 7}

Figure 8: An eight-disk array modeled using Q9

3.1.3 Additional values of n for which Kn models RAID
In addition to the infinite families of graphs on p and (2p – 1) vertices, there are graphs
on n vertices that admit perfect near-1-factorizations, where n equals, 15, 27, 35, 39, 49, 169,
243, 343, 729, 1331, 1369, 1849, 2197, 3125, and 6859 [41]. It is therefore possible to model
arrays with n disks that can tolerate two random disk failures for each of the aforementioned
values of n [25]. An important observation in this context is that, the existence of 1-factorizations
for every value of 2n, n ≥ 2, as conjectured [16], would enable us to model arrays with any
desired even number of disks.
3.1.4 Extending the model to arrays of arbitrary size
We note that the union of any two matchings in П is obtained by removing the edges
incident to the vertex in W from the Hamiltonian path formed by the union of the corresponding
near-1-factors in Ф. If W were to have two or more vertices, the union of any two matchings in П
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would be obtained by removing the edges incident to all the vertices in W from the Hamiltonian
path formed by the union of the corresponding near-1-factors in Ф. It is then clear that, the union
of any two matchings in П would still yield paths, each with a self-loop on at most one end. The
disks corresponding to a pair of such matchings can then be reconstructed in the manner
described for the six-disk RAID. We can therefore extend the algorithm in Figure 7 to create
arrays of n disks to tolerate two disk failures by choosing W such that, |W| = p – n and |W| = 2p –
n – 1 respectively, for n ≥ 3. We illustrate an array with n = 8 disks using p = 11 in Figure 9
created in this manner.

{4, 7}

{0, 2}

{0, 4}

{0, 6}

{1, 7}

{3, 7}

{0, 1}

{0, 3}

{5, 6}

{6, 7}

{1, 3}

{1, 5}

{2, 6}

{4, 6}

{5, 7}

{1, 2}

{0, 0}

{1, 1}

{2, 2}

{2, 4}

{3, 5}

{5, 5}

{6, 6}

{7, 7}

{3, 3}

{4, 4}

Figure 9: Algorithm to create an eight-disk array with V – W = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.

We derive the ratio of space used for parity in such an array with n disks by first
determining the number of data blocks in it. Earlier, we described the manner in which we delete
edges from the graph Qm to obtain a 2-disk fault-tolerant array with n = m – k disks, where m = p
or m = 2p – 1, and Km admits a perfect near-1-factorization. We noted that the number of data
blocks in such an array equals the number of remaining edges. We now determine that number
by iteratively removing a vertex v and all the edges incident to it, followed by the edges in the
matching that are colored the same as the self-loop at v.
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Suppose that in the first iteration we remove vertex u from Qm, the (m – 1) edges incident
to u and the ½(m – 1) edges colored the same as the self-loop at u. The remaining vertices are
each of degree (m – 3). Suppose that in the second iteration we remove vertex v from Qm, the (m
– 3) edges incident to v and the
is odd,

12 (m  2)

=

1
2

12 (m  2) edges colored the same as the self-loop at v. Since m

( m  3) . At this point, one vertex is of degree (m – 4) and the remaining

ones are of degree (m – 5) for the reason that, one vertex does not have an edge incident to it that
is colored the same as the self-loop at v, and therefore must have degree (m – 4). Now, to ensure
that we delete the least number of edges in the next iteration, we choose for deletion the vertex w
with the least degree i.e., (m – 5) in addition to its (m – 5) incident edges, and the

1
2

( m  3)

edges

colored the same as the self-loop at w. Proceeding in this manner, the maximum number of edges
removed in each iteration is as follows.
Iteration 1:

( m  1)  12 ( m  1)

Iteration 2:

(m  3)  12 (m  3)

Iteration 3:

(m  5)  12 (m  3)

Iteration 4:

(m  7)  12 (m  5)

Iteration 5:

( m  9)  12 ( m  5)

: :
Iteration i:

(m  2i  1)  12 (m  12 (2i  1  (1) ))
i

Then, the total number of edges removed up to and including iteration k is:
k



 (m  2i  1) 
i 1

1
2 (m

 12 ( 2i  1  ( 1) i ))

 14 [k (6m  5k  2)  k mod 2]
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The number of edges remaining at the end of k iterations is then:


1
1
2 m( m  1)  4 [ k (6m  5k

 2)  k mod 2]

The ratio of space used for parity in the array is then



(m  k )
1
2

m( m  1)  14 [ k (6m  5k  2)  k mod 2]  ( m  k )

It is easy to verify that this ratio has the optimal value of 2/(m – 1) when n = m – 1 by
observing that the optimal ratio of space used for storing parity in an n disk array equals 2/n.
Table 1 shows the number of arrays with (p – 1) and (2p – 2) disks in the second and
third columns respectively for the corresponding interval of n in the first column. The last
column shows the percentage of even values of n covered by their sum in the corresponding
interval.
Table 1: Even numbers admitted by (p – 1) and (2p – 2).

Interval of n

Number of arrays
with (p – 1) disks

Number of arrays
with (2p – 2) disks

Percentage of
even n covered

4 – 128

30

12

66.66

130 - 256

20

14

53.13

258 – 512

43

18

47.65

514 – 1024

76

34

42.96

1026 – 2048

138

60

38.67
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Figure 10 displays the percentage difference in the ratio of space used for parity by the
algorithm compared to the optimal value for array sizes between 5 and 255. Note that, prime
numbers occur more sparsely in intervals spanned by larger integers, and therefore, the
frequency at which the algorithm uses optimal values decreases as the size of the arrays
increases.
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Disks

Figure 10. Difference in the ratio of space used for parity by the algorithm to the optimal value.
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3.2 Approach using complete bipartite graphs
Algorithms have been proposed to model data and parity placement in arrays with (n – 1)
disks to tolerate two disk failures using complete bipartite graphs on 2n vertices, for n = p and n
= 2p – 1, where p is a prime number [24].
3.2.1 Using Kp, p to model (p – 1) disk arrays
As shown in the preceding algorithms, a two-disk fault-tolerant array is modeled by a
graph satisfying the following condition. The blocks in a disk correspond to the edges of a
matching in the graph, and the blocks in any pair of disks correspond to paths in the graph, each
having an end of degree 1. Such graphs can be derived from complete bipartite graphs with 2p
vertices as follows.
Let Qp, p be the complete bipartite graph on 2p vertices, p a prime, with a self-loop at each
vertex. Suppose that each edge (u, v) in it is colored u + v (mod p). Then, Qp, p can be factored
into p 1-factors such that the simple edges in the union of any two 1-factors form a Hamiltonian
cycle. This may be proved as follows.
Let Qp, p = (V, E) where V1 = {0, 1, …, p – 1} and V2 = {p, p + 1, …, 2p – 1} are the
bipartition subsets of V. Color each edge (u, v) of Qp, p with u + v (mod p) (including the self-loop
when u = v). Then, we shall show that, (a) the graph on the vertices of Qp, p formed by its proper
edges with a common color is a 1-factor of Qp, p, and (b) the proper edges in the union of any two
1-factors contains a Hamiltonian cycle. For the sake of brevity, we shall henceforth refer to
proper edges simply as edges and to self-loops explicitly.
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(a) First, we show that there are p independent edges with a common color by proving that no
two edges having a common color can be adjacent. Suppose to the contrary that, there exist a
pair of adjacent edges (u, v) and (v, w) both colored e. Then, we must have e ≡ u + v (mod p)
and e ≡ v + w (mod p). That is, u + v ≡ v + w (mod p) and therefore, u ≡ w (mod p). Since u
and w are both adjacent to v, both belong to the same bipartition subset, and therefore u = w.
A contradiction. Now, if there are less than p edges colored e1 say, then there must be more
than p edges colored e2, where e1 ≠ e2 and 0 ≤ e1, e2 ≤ p – 1. This is a result of the pigeonhole
2

principle, for there are p edges in Qp, p and p colors. Then, two edges colored e2 must be
adjacent. A contradiction. Hence, there must be exactly p independent edges having any
common color, and therefore, the graph on V formed by the edges with a common color is a
1-factor of Qp, p.
(b) Next, we show that the union of any two 1-factors forms a Hamiltonian cycle. Suppose to the
contrary, there exists a cycle v1, v2, v3, … vt, v1 in the union of two 1-factors with edges
alternately colored e1 and e2 where t < 2p. Without loss of generality, assume that the edges
(v1, v2), (v3, v4), … (vt – 1, vt) are colored e1, and (v2, v3), (v4, v5), … (vt , v1) are colored e2.
Note that t must be even. Therefore, let t = 2k, k < p. Then,
e1 ≡ (v1 + v2) (mod p),

e2 ≡ (v2 + v3) (mod p),

e1 ≡ (v3 + v4) (mod p),

e2 ≡ (v4 + v5) (mod p),

:
e1 ≡ (vt – 1 + vt) (mod p),

:
e2 ≡ (vt + v1) (mod p)

We can then easily prove that t(e1 – e2)/2 ≡ 0 (mod p) and therefore, k(e1 – e2) ≡ 0 (mod p).
This is a contradiction since p is a prime, and k, e1 and e2 are each less than p.
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From (a) and (b) we see that Qp, p admits a factorization into p 1-factors such the union of
any pair has 2p edges without a cycle having less than 2p edges. Hence the union of any two 1factors must form a Hamiltonian cycle. Figure 11 illustrates the Hamiltonian path formed by the
1-factors having edges colored 0 and 1.
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7

2

8

3

9

4

Figure 11: Q5, 5 and the Hamiltonian cycle formed by the 1-factors colored 0 and 1.

Given that Qp, p admits a perfect 1-factorization, we now remove edges from it such that
the union of the remaining edges in any pair of its 1-factors forms paths, each having a self-loop
on at most one end. Now, each Hamiltonian cycle formed by the union of a pair of 1-factors of
Qp, p is of the form shown in Figure 12. The distance between vertices u and v on such a cycle
with edges alternately colored 2v (mod p) and 2u (mod p) is p – 1. To show this, let us suppose
that {u, w1, w2, … wk – 1, v} is a path of length k. Then,
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u + w1 ≡ 2v (mod p),

w1 + w2 ≡ 2u (mod p)

w2 + w3 ≡ 2v (mod p),

w3 + w4 ≡ 2u (mod p)

:

:

wk – 2 + wk – 1 ≡ 2v (mod p), wk – 1 + v ≡ 2u (mod p)

u+p

v+p
w+p

v

w

u

Figure 12: A Hamiltonian cycle formed by a pair of 1-factors of Qp, p.

Then, it can be proved that (k + 1)(v – u) ≡ 0 (mod p), which implies that k = p – 1. In a
similar manner we can show that the distance between vertices (u + p) and (v + p) is also p – 1.
Using this observation, we remove each edge (u, u + p) in Qp, p, 0 ≤ u ≤ p – 1. Then the union of
the remaining edges in any pair of 1-factors yields a pair of paths of length p – 1, each having a
self-loop at both ends. Now, for any given vertex w on one of these paths, where 0 ≤ w ≤ p – 2,
vertex w + p must lie on the other path and vice versa. This is observed by enumerating the
vertices in the paths starting with their corresponding ends, u and u + p (say). Thus, if w is
adjacent to x + p, with the edge (x + p, w) colored a in one path, then w + p must be adjacent to x
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with the edge (x, w + p) colored a in the other. Using this observation, we next remove the
vertices w and w + p from Qp, p, for w  {0, 1, … p – 1}, and all the edges incident to them.
Finally we remove all edges colored 2w (mod p), which leads to all the edges of that 1-factor
being deleted. As a result, the union of the remaining edges in any pair of the other (p – 1) 1factors must yield paths having a self-loop on at most one end as shown in Figure 13.

u+p

v+p
w+p

v

w

u

Figure 13: Paths obtained by deleting the lighter colored edges from two 1-factors of Qp, p.

We now have the graph derived from Qp, p that models the placement of data and parity in
an array to tolerate two disk failures based on the characteristics of such a graph stated at the
beginning of this section. Figure 15 illustrates a four-disk array on the right modeled using the
graph in Figure 14 that is derived in the aforementioned manner from Q5, 5. In this array, disk d
contains the block {u, v} when the corresponding edge (u, v) in the graph is colored d, where 1 ≤
d ≤ 4. Now, if for example disks 1 and 2 have failed in this array, their blocks may be
reconstructed in the order {7, 4}, {4, 8}, {8, 8}, followed by {2, 9}, {9, 3}, {3, 3}, followed by
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{1, 1} and {6, 6}. Note that, each of these sequences corresponds to paths with a self-loop on
exactly one end that are formed by the edges in the pair of 1-factors of Q5, 5 colored 1 and 2.
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Figure 14: The graph derived from Q5, 5.

{3, 3}

{6, 6}

{6, 2}

{6, 3}

{7, 4}

{1, 1}

{7, 1}

{7, 7}

{8, 8}

{8, 4}

{4, 4}

{8, 1}

{9, 2}

{9, 3}

{9, 9}

{2, 2}

Figure 15: Four-disk array modeled from the graph derived from Q5, 5.
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3.2.2 Using K2p – 1, 2p – 1 to model (2p – 2) disk arrays
Let Q2p – 1, 2p – 1 be the complete bipartite graph on 4p – 2 vertices, p a prime, with a selfloop at each vertex. The placement of data and parity in an array with 2p – 2 disks to tolerate two
disk failures using Q2p – 1, 2p – 1 can be modeled in a manner similar to Qp – 1, p – 1. We now describe
the method for obtaining a perfect 1-factorization of Q2p – 1, 2p – 1 from the perfect 1-factorization
of K2p for which constructions have been proposed by Anderson [4] and Kobayashi [15]. Let K2p
= (V, E) where V = {0, 1, …, 2p – 1}. Then, Kobayashi’s construction defines a 1-factor of K2p
having edges colored e as,
e e

{(i, j ) | i  j  e}  {( 2 , 2  p)} when e is even
Fe  

{(i, j ) | i is odd , and i  j  e (mod 2 p)} when e is odd and e  p.

This defines (2p – 1) 1-factors for K2p, where 0 ≤ e ≤ 2p – 1 and e ≠ p, such that the union
of the edges of any pair forms a Hamiltonian cycle. Using the 1-factors of K2p, the edges of K2p –
1, 2p – 1

are colored to create a perfect 1-factorizarion using a method proposed by Laufer [18]. It

is as follows. Let K2p – 1, 2p – 1 = (V, E) where V1 = {0, 1, …, 2p – 2} and V2 = {2p – 1, 2p, …, 4p –
3} are the bipartition subsets of V. Let c(u, v) be the color assigned to an edge (u, v) in K2p – 1, 2p –
1,

and e(w, x) the color assigned to an edge (w, x) in K2p. Then, for 0 ≤ u, v ≤ 2p – 2,
e(u  1, v  1), if u  v
c(u, v  2 p  1)  c(v, u  2 p  1)  
e(0, v  1), if u  v

The proper edges of Q2p – 1, 2p – 1 are colored the same as the edges of K2p – 1, 2p – 1, and each
self-loop (u, u) on the vertices of Q2p – 1, 2p – 1 is colored as,
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c(u, u)  u, for 0  u  2 p  2

Each Hamiltonian cycle constructed in this manner is described by a sequence of vertices
u, u + 2p – 1, …, v + 2p – 1, v, …, u, where 0 ≤ u, v ≤ 2p – 2. In such a cycle, the shortest paths
between vertices u and v, and between vertices u + 2p – 1 and v + 2p – 1 are of length 2p – 2.
These paths correspond to the subpath that is obtained from the Hamiltonian cycle in K2p defined
by the sequence of vertices u + 1, 0, v + 1, …, u + 1, by removing vertex 0 and the edges (0, u
+ 1) and (0, v + 1).
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Figure 16: The Hamiltonian path formed by edges colored 0 and 1 in Q9, 9.
Figure 16 illustrates the 1-factors formed by the edges colored 1 and 2 in Q9, 9 and the
Hamiltonian cycle formed by their union using the aforementioned coloring scheme. The solid
lines indicate the edges colored 1, and the dotted lines indicate the edges colored 2. We observe
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that the paths defined by the sequences of vertices 0, 14, 6, 13, 3, 16, 8, 11, 1 and 9, 5, 15, 4,
12, 7, 17, 2, 10 correspond to the subpath that is obtained from the Hamiltonian cycle in K10
defined by the sequence of vertices 1, 0, 2, …, 1, by removing vertex 0 and the edges (0, 1) and
(0, 2).
Now remove edges from Q2p – 1, 2p – 1 in the same manner as that described earlier for Qp, p
such that the union of the remaining edges in any pair of its 1-factors forms paths, each having a
self-loop on at most one end. To this end, we first remove each edge (u, u + 2p – 1) in Q2p – 1, 2p –
1,

0 ≤ u ≤ 2p – 2, such that the union of the remaining edges in any pair of 1-factors yields a pair

of paths, each having a self-loop at both ends. Next, we remove the vertices v and v + 2p – 1
from Q2p – 1, 2p – 1, for some v  {0, 1, … 2p – 2}, followed by all the edges incident to those
vertices. Finally, we remove all edges colored v, which leads to all the edges of that 1-factor
being deleted. Therefore, the union of the remaining edges in any pair of the other (2p – 2) 1factors must yield paths having a self-loop on at most one end. Hence, this graph must model the
placement of data and parity in an array to tolerate two disk failures.
3.2.3 Using Kp, p to model p disk arrays
The previously described models using Qp, p and Q2p – 1, 2p – 1, p a prime, placed data and
parity in arrays with p – 1 and 2p – 2 disks respectively to tolerate two disk failures. We now
show how to use Qp, p to place data and parity in arrays with p disks to tolerate two disk failures.
First, color each edge (u, v) in Qp, p with u + v (mod p) to obtain a perfect 1-factorization.
Consider the Hamiltonian cycle formed by the union of a pair of 1-factors of Qp, p having edges
colored a and b, 0 ≤ a, b ≤ p – 1. Let a ≡ 2u (mod p) and b ≡ 2v (mod p). Then, as proven earlier,

33

the distance between vertices u and v, as well as between vertices u + p and v + p on that cycle is
p – 1. Now, from each 1-factor with edges colored 2v (mod p), 0 ≤ v ≤ p – 1, we remove the
edges (v, v + p) and (v + 1, (v + p – 1) (mod p) + p) to obtain a matching with p – 2 edges. Then
the union of a pair of such matchings with edges colored 2u (mod p) and 2v (mod p) and their
identically colored self-loops form paths, each having a self-loop on at most one end. This is
because, the removal of the edges (u, u + p) and (v, v + p) from the Hamiltonian path formed by
the union of edges colored 2u (mod p) and 2v (mod p) yields two paths, each having a self-loop
at both its ends. Finally, since the distance between vertices (u + 1) (mod p) and (v + 1) (mod p)
on that Hamiltonian path is p – 1, each of the aforementioned two paths must have exactly one of
the edges (u + 1, (u + p – 1) (mod p) + p) and (v + 1, (v + p – 1) (mod p) + p) on it. Hence, upon
removing them we must obtain paths, each having a self-loop on at most one end. Again, by our
argument in section 2, this graph must model the placement of data and parity in an array to
tolerate two disk failures.
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Figure 17: Paths corresponding to the reconstruction sequences of blocks on disks 1 and 2.

Figure 17 displays the pair of matchings in Q5, 5 corresponding to disks 0 and 1. These are
the edges of the 1-factor with edges colored 0 remaining upon removing the edges (0, 5) and (1,
9), and the edges of the 1-factor with edges colored 1 remaining upon removing the edges (3, 8)
and (4, 7). The union of these matchings yields four paths with vertices 1, 4, 7, and 9 as their
ends, with each of degree 1, and a self-loop at its other end. Thus, reconstruction of disks 0 and 1
in the event of their failure can start with any data block corresponding to the edges incident to
those vertices. Figure 18 shows the five-disk array obtained using the previously described
model. If disks 1 and 2 in this array were to fail for instance, their data blocks could be
reconstructed in the order given by the sequence of blocks {1, 5}, {5, 5} followed by {7, 3), {3,
3), followed by {4, 6}, {6, 0}, {0, 0} and finally {9, 2}, {2, 8}, {8, 8}.
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{9, 0}

Figure 18: An array constructed from Q5, 5.
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4. METHODS TO MODEL AND FORECAST NETWORK ATTACKS
We propose a model that decouples attack graphs from the networked systems on which
they are described. This approach is motivated by the following reason. Each system is reachable
from every other in a network. Hence, to execute the sequence of exploits needed to achieve its
goal, a malware relies only on the existence of the preconditions necessary to execute each,
regardless of which system provides each precondition. However, to meaningfully define an
attack graph unique to an attack goal and an attack path, we first state the following definitions.
Definition 1: A network is a pair G = (S, E), where S is a set of systems and E is a set of 2tuples, and given si, sj in S, (si, sj) is in E if and only if si and sj can communicate with each other.
We assume that si can communicate with sj if physical cabling can be traced from si to sj, and the
routers that control data flow on the cabling between those systems, permit data from si to reach
sj and vice versa.
Definition 2: A network service is an application on a system that has the ability to transmit and
receive data to and from network services on other systems. Each service utilizes a unique port
number for the transmission and reception of data from its peers.
Definition 3: A network service on a system s is said to be targeted by an exploit e if e attempts
to utilize it to enhance its privileges on s. Since we want to determine how applications with
vulnerabilities are exploited by their peers in a network, we restrict our discussion to network
services only. For brevity, we shall hereafter refer to each simply as a service.
Definition 4: A service v on a system s is said to be compromised if an exploit that targets v
succeeds in gaining privileges on s. We refer to s as the host of v.
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Definition 5: A service v is assigned a rank using the set of permissions on a system hosting v
that can be usurped by compromising v. Thus, given services v1 and v2, the rank of v1 is greater
than that of v2, if the set of permissions usurped by compromising v2 is a subset of the set of
permissions usurped by compromising v1. We denote the rank of a service v as rank(v).
Definition 6: A honeypot is a system in a network that admits exploits that target it, and enables
security experts to analyze the characteristics of such exploits to determine the behavior of the
attackers that perpetrate them. In the following section we construct the network required to
derive attack graphs from observed exploits.
4.1 A network to derive attack graphs
Suppose that R = {r1, r2, …, rn} and S = {s1, s2, …, sn} are two sets of honeypots where
each si in S rejects any transmissions to it other than those from ri in R, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This can be
achieved, for instance, by confining each pair of systems {ri, si} to a unique domain, and
rejecting all transmissions to si originating from outside its own domain. However, systems
outside the domain of si can counter this by impersonating ri. They can achieve this by
overwriting the valid 2-tuple comprised of the IP and media access control (MAC) addresses of
ri in the ARP cache of si with the spurious 2-tuple comprised of the IP address of ri and the MAC
address of the impersonator. To prevent this from occurring, the initially valid 2-tuple that
associates the IP and MAC addresses of ri, is never allowed to be replaced.
Each system in R and S is actually a virtual machine that is simulated within a physical
server using a tool such as VMware WorkStation. This enables a physical server to simulate
multiple systems in a network, and thereby furnish the means for realizing the large number of
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systems needed to implement our proposed solution in practice. For the sake of brevity, we shall
henceforth refer to each virtual machine simply as a system.
Initially, the honeypots are initialized such that, no service on any system in R transmits
data to any service on any system in S. Any transmission that is observed thereafter is scanned to
determine if it is harmless. For example, a SYN packet that is typically used to initiate a TCP
connection or to scan a port is judged to be harmless. On the other hand, an unfamiliar
transmission is considered to be an exploit. In the latter case, the system in R from which the
transmission originated is deemed to have been compromised.

R

V – {v1}

V – {v2}

V – {vn}

r1

r2

rn

S

V

V

V

s1

s2

sn

Figure 19: A network with 2n honeypots.

Suppose that V = {v1, v2, …, vn} is the set of services on which attack paths are to be
found. Then, we initialize each system ri in R to contain each service in V – {vi}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Figure 19 illustrates the aforementioned network. The rectangle with rounded corners shown
within each system specifies the services on that system, and arc (ri, si) indicates the exploits that
are permitted to originate from ri to target si, but not vice versa.
Legal liabilities inhibit honeypots from propagating attacks that are known to it. As a
result, an attacker can identify a system s that has been ostensibly compromised as being a
honeypot, if exploits designed by the attacker to originate from s do not occur. To ensure that
attackers continue to launch exploits targeting systems in S from system in R, it is essential that
they are not alerted to the fact that systems in S are honeypots. Hence, attacks are allowed to
originate from systems in S. To this end, we allow systems in S to transmit only to those in
another set, T say, where each system in T is protected with up-to-date internet security software.
4.2 Deriving an attack graph
Definition 7: An attack graph is a pair H = (V, A), where A is a set of arcs, and given vi, vj in V,
(vi, vj) is in A if and only if vi can be compromised to yield the postcondition necessary to exploit
vj. Then, vi is called the predecessor of vj. Next, we show how to derive such attack graphs.
Suppose that k systems in S are each targeted on port p by an instance of exploit e. Since,
each service utilizes unique port numbers we can assume that the same service v has been
targeted by e on each of the k systems. Now, an instance of e targeting a given system in S must
originate from a unique system in R, since ri in R is permitted to transmit to si in S only, for 1 ≤ i
≤ n. Let p be the probability that a service on a system r in R has been compromised given that r
is the source of an exploit e. Assuming that the probability of an internal attack on r, such as one
perpetrated by a disgruntled employee with administrative privileges on r, is relatively low, we
have p ≈ 1. However, it is possible that a service has been compromised in r even when no
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exploit is observed to originate from it. For instance, an attacker may have compromised a
service on r but not yet leveraged it to launch an exploit. So, let q be the probability that a service
in r has been compromised given that r is not a source of e. In our proposed network, each
system in S can be targeted by an exploit launched from a unique system in R only. Hence, an
attack that is keen to propagate itself to all systems in S is very likely to eventually use a
compromised service u in each system in R to launch the corresponding exploit that required the
attacker to compromise u in the first place. In other words, if after prolonged observation, r is not
found to be a source of e, it is very likely that no service has been compromised on r to launch e.
Thus, we have (1 – q) ≈ 1, and therefore, 0 ≈ q < p ≈ 1.
Let C(n, k) denote the number of k-combinations of an n-set. Now, suppose that e
originates from k given systems in R. Since, there are C(n – k, m – k) m-sets of systems with
every system in each of those m-sets containing each service common to those k systems, the
probability pk that a service common to k such systems has been compromised equals C(n – k, m
– k)pkqm – k. Then, since m = n – 1 in our network we have,
pk
p(m  k  1)
p(n  k )


p k 1 q(n  k  1) q(n  k  1)

Now, 0 ≈ q < p ≈ 1. Hence,

pk
 1 , for 1 ≤ k < n.
p k 1

Thus, the probability that a service has been compromised is greater when the number of
systems k containing it, which are the origins of a common exploit, is greater. Now consider the
following cases.
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Case 1 k = (n – 1)
The intersection of the sets of services in the (n – 1) systems in R from which instances of
e exploit the (n – 1) systems in S, must contain exactly one service, u say. By our preceding
discussion, the likelihood of an attack having compromised u to yield the postcondition to
exploit v must be high. Hence, we designate u as the predecessor of v.
Case 2 k < (n – 1)
The intersection of the sets of services that are the origins of e has (n – k) services, v1, v2,
…, vn – k say, where (n – k) > 1. Let U = {v1, v2, …, vn – k}. In that case, each service in U may be
a predecessor of v in the derived attack graph. However, if k is relatively small, and the number
of services in V that admit the precondition necessary for e to occur is small, then having all
services in U as predecessors of v in an attack graph yields larger numbers of false positives. To
avoid this, we can wait till the value of k is observed to be larger. In the meantime we may apply
the following criteria to prune the number of services in U that are predecessors of v.
(i) Suppose that (n – 1) systems in R having service u have been observed to target the service v
as well as the service vi on systems in S, where i {1, 2, …, k}. By our argument in Case 1,
u must then be a predecessor of both vi and v. Then, vi cannot be a predecessor of v for the
following reason. If an attacker has already found a service u to compromise in order to
exploit v, then there is no benefit in compromising vi as an intermediate step after
compromising u in order to exploit v. Hence we can eliminate vi from the set of likely
predecessors of v.
(ii) Suppose that (n – 1) systems in R having service vi are observed to be targeting the service w
on systems in S, where i {1, 2, …, k}, and rank(w) < rank(s). Then, by our argument in
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Case 1, vi is a predecessor of service w. Now an attacker that has compromised service vi
earlier to exploit w cannot be exploiting v later if rank(w) < rank(v). This is because exploits
are designed by an attacker to usurp privileges with reasonable confidence of success.
Hence, an attacker that intends to exploit a higher ranked service v will do so without
exploiting a lower ranked service w first. Therefore, we can eliminate vi from the set of
likely predecessors of v.
Case 3 k = n
Unfortunately, this implies that two or more services have been compromised to enable
exploit e to be launched from each system in R. However, such an occurrence is rare because of
the following reason. In order to obtain the desired privileges on a system r that enables the
launch of e from r, an attacker has to first find a vulnerability admitted by a service on r that can
be compromised to yield those privileges, and then write a program to achieve that. Neither task
is trivial. Hence, upon finding a vulnerability in a service and the exploit necessary to
compromise it, there is little reason for the attacker to find another service that can be
compromised to enable the launch of e, unless the existing mechanism to compromise the former
service is rendered ineffective by network security. Hence, the occurrence of this case should be
limited.
Using the inferences from Case 1 and Case 2, an attack graph H = (V, A) is constructed
over time. A service in V that does not have a successor in H is then that which can be exploited
by an attack to realize the postcondition satisfying its goal. Note that H may have multiple such
services. Also, it may admit self-loops as well as arcs having the same tail and head. Now, an
attack graph may be alternatively defined as follows.
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Definition 8: An attack graph is a directed graph H = (V, A) where each vertex v in V is a
vulnerability and each arc (u, v) in A is an action a originating from a system having
vulnerability u that has been exploited to yield the condition for a to exploit a system with
vulnerability v. A unique vertex vf in V represents the end vulnerability that can be exploited by
the attack to realize the postcondition that immediately satisfies its goal. Thus an attack path is a
unique path in H that contains vf as its end.
Figure 20 illustrates an example of an attack graph described by Definition 8, where
vulnerabilities v1 and v2 – each having in-degree 0 – are starting points for an attack, and whose
goal is achieved by exploiting vulnerability v6. In this graph, the sequences of vulnerabilities v1,
v3+, v6, and v2, v4, v6, and v2, v5, v6 represent attack paths, where v+ denotes one or more
occurrences of v. Each has vulnerability v6 as its end, which can be exploited to yield the
postcondition that satisfies the goal of the attack.

v2

v1

v4

v3

v5

v6
Figure 20: An attach graph with attack paths.
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The graphs given by Definition 7 and Definition 8 are closely related for the following
reason. A given vulnerability is unique to a service. Hence for each edge (u, v) in the graph given
by Definition 8, there exists an edge between the services containing vulnerabilities u and v
respectively in the graph given by Definition 7, and vice versa. Hence, the terms service and
vulnerability are interchangeable. However, a graph H given by Definition 7 admits multiple
services without successors. For each such service s in H we can obtain the graph Hs that has s as
its only vertex without a successor, by removing any vertex from H that is not an ancestor of s.
In this manner we obtain multiple graphs from H that together contain all the attack paths in H.
Each attack graph that we refer to hereafter shall be assumed to have exactly one vertex without
an ancestor.
4.3 Using an attack graph
We now describe how the given model of an attack graph can be used to determine the
likelihood of an alert corresponding to a multi-step attack. Suppose an IDS generates an alert
corresponding to an exploit originating from system s2 targeting vulnerability v1 at time t1 on
system s1. Then, we determine if s1 admits v1. If not, we discard that alert as irrelevant, else we
find a predecessor of v1 in a chosen attack graph H, v2 say, and determine if s2 admits v2. If true,
we determine if an alert has been seen at some time t2 < t1 for an exploit targeting v2 on s2.
Suppose this is true, and the system from which that exploit originates is s3. Then we find a
predecessor of v2 in H, v3 say, and determine if s3 admits v3. If true, we again determine if an
alert has been seen at some time t3 < t2 for an exploit targeting v3 on s3. We continue
backtracking in this manner until one of the following three cases occurs.
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(a) Upon examining an alert at time tk – 1 corresponding to an exploit from system sk targeting
vulnerability vk – 1 on system sk – 1, we backtrack to the predecessor of vk – 1 in the chosen
attack graph, vk say, and find that sk admits vk, but vk has no predecessor.
(b) After inspecting the alert corresponding to an exploit from system sk

+ 1

targeting

vulnerability vk on system sk, we backtrack to the predecessor of vulnerability vk in the
chosen attack graph, vk + 1 say, and find that vk + 1 is not admitted by sk + 1. There are three
possible scenarios that can cause this:
(b.1) sk + 1 already admits the postcondition for an exploit to target vk on sk. This implies
that the exploits targeting the sequence of vulnerabilities vk, vk – 1, …, v1 represent a
legitimate multi-step attack on system s1.
(b.2) The chosen attack graph may not correspond to the attack that is ostensibly occurring.
(b.3) The attack may be exploiting an unknown vulnerability on sk

+ 1

to exploit the

sequence of vulnerabilities vk, vk – 1, …, v1 thereafter.
(c) Upon examining an alert generated at time tk

– 1

for an exploit from system sk targeting

vulnerability vk – 1 on system sk – 1, we backtrack to the predecessor of vk – 1 in the chosen
attack graph, vk say, and find that sk admits vk. However, there is no alert originating from
any system that targets vk on sk at time tk < tk – 1.
4.4 Correlating an alert to an attack
Using the previously described model of an attack graph, we can correlate an alert to an
attack in the following manner. If (a) holds true and v1 = vf in the attack graph being used, then
we have found a complete sequence of exploits targeting each vulnerability in an attack path
with vf at its end. We refer to such a path as a complete attack path and its length as the complete
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attack length. It would then be intuitive to assume that such an occurrence indicates a legitimate
multi-step attack that targets system s1. In the event (b.2) holds true, we can substitute the attack
graph being currently used with another that contains vulnerability v1 and repeat the process of
backtracking along the new graph to see if (a) or (b.1) holds. We may obtain such a graph after a
number of substitutions. However, if no such attack graph is found, then we have to reconcile the
matching of partial sequences of vulnerabilities vk, vk – 1, …, v1 for each examined attack graph
with the likelihood that it represents a real attack. It is intuitively appealing that the greater the
length of the sequence vk, vk – 1, …, v1 that is matched, the greater the likelihood that the alert
targeting vulnerability v1 corresponds to a legitimate multi-step attack. We refer to the value of k
in this matching attack subpath as the matching attack length, and its difference from the
complete attack length as the remaining attack length. Furthermore, if ui, ui – 1, …, u1 and vj, vj – 1,
…, v1 are the partial sequence of vulnerabilities that are matched by employing the attack graphs
H and H’ respectively say, with i > j, then it is intuitive to assume that H is the attack graph that
best describes the perceived attack. Finally, (b.3) and (c) may be caused by the exploit on sk
being stealthy, or the IDS rules not being adequately comprehensive to detect such an exploit.
Algorithm 1 uses the previously described model to determine if an alert corresponding
to an exploit constitutes an attack. Step 1 is executed once for a given network, while Step 2 is
executed each time an alert is generated by an IDS thereafter. If the alert is correlated to an
attack, Step 2 returns the sequence of 2-tuples comprised of the systems and their corresponding
vulnerabilities that have been iteratively targeted by that attack. Such a sequence forms an attack
instance as defined next.
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Algorithm 1
Correlate(vulnerability v, system s, time t, int matchLen)
{
if (v ≠ null) and (s admits v) and
(alert found for exploit targeting v on s at time tv < t) then
e ← exploit at time tv for which alert is found
t ← tv
P ← P  (v, s)
s ← origin system of e
matchLen ← matchLen + 1
if (v has predecessors in Gi) then
for each predecessor u of v in Gi do
Correlate(u, s, t, matchLen)
end for
else
Correlate(null, s, t, matchLen)
end if
else
corr 

matchLen
1

matchLen  d ( w, w f ) d ( w, w f )  1

if (corr > maxCorr) then
maxCorr ← corr
Pmax ← P
end if
end if
}
Step 1:

S = Systems in a subnet
V = Set of vulnerabilities admitted by all systems in S
n = Size of the set of attack goals admitted by V
for attack goal i ← 1 to n generate attack graph Gi on V

Step 2:

e ← exploit at time t for which alert is raised
s ← system targeted by e
w ← vulnerability targeted by e
Pmax ← 
maxCorr ← 0
i←1
t←∞
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while (i ≤ n) do
d(w, wf) ← distance of w to end vulnerability wf in Gi
P ← 
Correlate(w, s, t, –1)
i←i+1
end while
if (maxCorr > τ) then
return (Pmax, i)
else
return null
end if
Figure 21: Algorithm to identify an attack from an alert.

va
sa

vb

vb

sc

sb

vc
sd
Figure 22: An attack instance with an attack subpath

Definition 9: Let G = (S, E) be a network and H = (V, A) be an attack graph. Given an attack
path in H defined by the sequence of vulnerabilities v1, v2, …, vk, an attack instance is the
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sequence of tuples (s1, v1), (s2, v2), …, (si, vi) where i ≤ k and systems s1, s2, …, si in S admit v1,
v2, …, vi respectively as a matching attack subpath.
Figure 22 illustrates an example of an attack instance comprised of the tuples (sa, va), (sb,
vb), (sc, vb), and (sd, vc). In this instance, systems sa, sb, sc, sd admit an attack path comprised of
the attack path va, vb, vb, vc. The correlation factor corr in Algorithm 1 is defined such that it is
proportional to the ratio of the matching attack length to the complete attack length. At the same
time, it is inversely proportional to the remaining attack length. This enables the correlation
value of an attack to be proportional to the proximity of vf to the vulnerability targeted by its
most recently observed exploit. Finally, the threshold τ is a suitable real value in (0, 2.0).
Execution of Step 2 of Algorithm 1 returns the tuple (P, i) if an attack instance P using
the attack graph Hi is correlated to the investigated alert. Now, suppose that it returns (P1, i1) in
response to an alert for an exploit e1 at time t1, and (P2, i2) in response to an alert for an exploit e2
at time t2, where t2 > t1. If i1 ≠ i2 and P1 is a subsequence of P2, then P2 must represent an attack
that is different from P1, since by Definition 1, each attack graph has a unique goal. On the other
hand, if i1 = i2 then we obtain vindication of the algorithm’s earlier result that suggested an attack
with the goal of the attack graph having index i1.
The depths of attack graphs are generally small since the average length of a sequence of
vulnerabilities exploited to achieve a desired security breach is small. Furthermore, the system
that is examined for the predecessor of a given vulnerability v is specified by the alert for the
exploit targeting v, and therefore, its discovery is achieved in constant time using suitable data
structures such as a hash table. Thus, the order of Algorithm 1 is dominated by the number of
attack graphs examined. If their number equals n, then the algorithm has order O(n). Moreover,
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since the value of n is independent of the size of the network, the proposed model with its
associated algorithm to identify attacks is scalable.
Algorithm 1 identifies attack instances on a subnet when the vulnerabilities on all
systems have been identified in Step 1. However, it does not identify the systems that are future
targets of exploits by an identified attack. For example, suppose that (s1, v1), (s2, v2), …, (sj, vj) is
an identified attack instance using the attack graph with the final goal vulnerability vf, where
systems s1, s2, …, sj admit vulnerabilities v1, v2, …, vj respectively, and vj ≠ vf. Then Algorithm 1
does not identify the systems that are likely to be targeted next by that attack to realize its goal of
exploiting vf. For instance, the attack may next target systems sa and sb that admit vulnerabilities
vi and vj + 1 using exploits from systems si – 1 and sj respectively, for some 1 ≤ i < j, as shown in
Figure 23. Next, we describe the method to identify such systems.

v1
s1

v2

vj

vi – 1

sj

si – 1

s2

vj + 1

vi
sa

Figure 23: Future exploit targets of an identified attack.
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sb

4.5 Forecasting the propagation of attacks
To determine the systems that are likely to be targeted by an attack in the future utilizes
the idea of matching the remaining attack length of an attack path in the direction of the goal. As
described earlier, Algorithm 1 returns the index i of the attack graph corresponding to the
matched attack instance. Now, if the remaining attack length is zero, then the system specified in
the first tuple (v1, s1) of an attack instance is the system targeted by the attack. On the other hand,
if the remaining attack length is nonzero, d say, then we iteratively find the sequence of systems
sk + 1, sk + 2, … sk + d such that, system sj admits vulnerability vj, for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ k + d, vj + 1 is a child
of vj in the attack graph, vk + 1 is the child of v1, and vk + d = vf. However, in some iteration j,
multiple systems may admit the vulnerability vj that is a descendant of v1. Therefore, to
definitively identify the next system that is likely to be targeted, we determine that malware’s
past preferences when selecting a system to exploit under such circumstances.
Consider a malware that has just compromised system s within a private network by
exploiting vulnerability u on it, and whose eventual goal is to exploit vulnerability vf
Furthermore, suppose that (u, v) is an arc in the attack graph with goal vf. Since a malware
propagates itself in the manner dictated by the flow of its coded logic, it can be expected to
exhibit predictable traits in choosing the next system to exploit in the set of systems that all
admit vulnerability v. For instance, that malware may be designed to next exploit, from s, the
system that admits vulnerability v and belongs to the same private network as s. On the other
hand, if s is a router, then that malware may be designed to immediately exploit another router
that admits v. Similarly, it may choose the host having the lowest version of the operating system
that admits vulnerability v. We now describe how such preferences are measured.
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First, we define a system state as a tuple z = (v, x1, x2, …, xm) in V x X1 x X2 x … x Xm of
m + 1 independent variables that describes the state of a system, where V is the set of all
vulnerabilities and Xi is the domain of characteristic xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for some integer value m. For
example, we may have X1 = {a11, a12, a13}, where a11 denotes a system having a private class C
IP address of the form 192.168.b1.b2, with 0 ≤ b1, b2 ≤ 255; a12 represents a system having a
private class B IP address of the form 172.b1.b2.b3, with 16 ≤ b1 ≤ 31 and 0 ≤ b2, b3 ≤ 255; and
a13 represents a system having a private class A IP address of the form 10.b1.b2.b3, with 0 ≤ b1,
b2, b3 ≤ 255. Similarly, we may have X2 = {a21, a22, …, a2r} as the set of r unique combinations
of operating systems and version numbers that indicate their respective service packs or patches.
Also, we may have X3 = {a31, a32}, where a31 denotes a system that is a router and a32 denotes
otherwise. In this manner, we identify x1, x2, …, xm while ensuring that their respective domains
do not omit any values that characterizes a system.
Since each variable comprising a system state has a finite domain, we must have a finite
number of such states. Then, the conditional probability of an attack being in the system state zi
when the preceding system state is zj, denoted as p(zi | zj), may be derived in the following
manner. For each pair of system states zi and zj we determine over all attack instances of the form
(v1, s1), (v2, s2), …, (vk, sk), k > 0, the number of occurrences cj where a system st is in state zj,
and the number of occurrences ci, j where a system st is in state zj and system st + 1 is in state zi, for
t < k. Then, p(zi | zj) = ci, j /cj. We may represent the probabilities of such pairs of states using a
matrix P = (p)i j, where entry (i, j) equals p(zi | zj). Now, given any system, its state must be a
tuple in V x X1 x X2 x … x Xm, since by construction, each domain is chosen such that each and
every system is characterized by a unique value within it. As a result, a system’s state is also
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unique. Hence a given pair of systems r and s have a unique pair of corresponding states zr and zs
respectively. Then the probability of an attack exploiting vulnerability v on s from r, using its
prior exploitation of vulnerability u on r is given by the conditional probability p(zs | zr). For
simplicity of notation we denote this simply as p(s, r).
Algorithm 2 utilizes the function FindTarget to perform a depth-first search for the
targeted system. In each stage of recursion, it searches the branches from a system r to each
system s in decreasing order of the conditional probability value p(s, r), where s admits the next
vulnerability in the attack path towards vf following that admitted by r. If a target is not found by
proceeding down a branch, FindTarget backtracks to r and resumes its search on the branch
having the next lower conditional probability value. It continues in this manner until a branch
returns a target system, or all branches have been exhausted.

Algorithm 2
FindTarget(system s, set of systems R, vulnerability u)
{
if (u = vf) then
return s
else
R←R–s
target ← null
for each successor v of u in attack graph Gi do
Let Rv = {r1, …, rj} be the set of systems in R that admit v,
with p(ri, s) ≥ p(ri + 1, s), 1 ≤ i < j
if (Rv ≠ empty and target = null) then
i←1
while (target = null and i < j) do
target ← FindTarget(ri, Rv, v)
i←i+1
end while
end if
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end for
end if
return target
}
Execution Step

S = Systems in a subnet
R←S
Suppose Algorithm 1 returns (P, i)
Let P = (v1, s1), (v2, s2), …, (vk, sk)
for j ← 1 to k do
R ← R – sj, where sj is a member of a tuple in P
end for
FindTarget(sk, R, vk)

Figure 24: Algorithm to identify the target of an attack
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5. CONCLUSION
The first objective of this research is to utilize graph theoretic techniques to model RAID
capable of tolerating two random disk failures using bit-wise XOR operations only, and using an
optimal ratio of space for parity. The techniques shown in this thesis place data and parity in
arrays of n disks to tolerate two random disk failures for the values of n = (p – 1), p and (2p – 2).
These values cover significant numbers of the disks that may constitute arrays in practice, but not
all. Hence, extending the coverage to additional values of n is of great practical interest.
The second objective of this research is to devise more powerful techniques for
correlating alerts with attacks in the context of network defense. The technique shown in this
thesis correlates alerts to attacks with relatively high certainty by examining a sufficient number
of the former after they have occurred. While that number is relatively small, the systems on
which those alerts are generated are implicitly sacrificed to the attack. This is undesirable if those
systems contain critical data that is shared by multiple clients, and whose availability cannot be
interrupted. Hence, extending our technique to achieve correlation before network resources
have been compromised is of significant practical value.
5.1 Modeling two-disk fault-tolerant RAID with additional numbers of disks
In section 0, we demonstrated the technique for using the complete bipartite graph on 2p
vertices Kp, p to model an array with p disks that is capable of tolerating two random disk failures.
In a similar manner, it may be possible to use the complete bipartite graph on (4p – 2) vertices
K2p – 1, 2p – 1 to model the placement of data and parity in an array with (2p – 1) disks.
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Perfect 1-factorizations are known to exist for the complete bipartite graph on 2n vertices
Kn, n, where n = p2, p a prime [8]. Therefore, similar techniques may be used to obtain solutions
for data and parity assignment in arrays with p2 or (p2 – 1) disks to tolerate two disk failures.
Developing such techniques is an area for future research.
5.2 Modeling RAID to tolerate three random disk failures
Arrays deployed in practice generally have smaller numbers of disks. Hence, their ability
to tolerate the failure of up to two random disks is adequate. However, as increasingly larger
arrays are deployed, the need for tolerance to more than two random disk failures is compelling.
A scheme [22] that achieves this is illustrated in Figure 25.
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Figure 25: A three-disk fault tolerant array
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In the previously illustrated array, parity is stored in the blocks h(i), l(j) and r(k), for 0 ≤ i
≤ m – 1, 0 ≤ j, k ≤ m + n – 2, and m > n. These parities are calculated in the following manner.
h(i)  {i, 0}  {i,1}  ...  {i, n  1}

{0, j}  {1, j  1}  ...  { j, 0}

l ( j )  { j  n  1, n  1}  { j  n  2, n  2}  ...  { j , 0}
{ j  n  1, n  1}  { j  n  2, n  2}  ...  {m  1, j  m  1}


if 0  j  n  1,
if n  j  m  1,
if m  j  m  n  2

if 0  k  n  1,
{0, n  k  1}  {1, n  k}  ...  {k , n  1}

r (k )  {k  n  1, 0}  {k  n,1}  ...  {k , n  1}
if n  k  m  1,
{k  n  1, 0}  {k  n,1}  ...  {m  1, m  n  k  1} if m  k  m  n  2

Now, suppose that three disks i, j and k have failed in this array. Then, we prove by
induction that the data in those disks can be iteratively reconstructed as follows. Assume without
loss of generality that, i < j < k. In the first iteration, we reconstruct blocks {0, i}, {0, k} and {0,
j}. Block {0, i} is reconstructed using the parity in block l(i). This is possible because the blocks
used for computing the parity in block {0, i} all occur to the left of disk i, which are all intact.
Next, block {0, k} is reconstructed using the parity in block r(k). This is possible because the
blocks contributing to the parity in block {0, k} all occur to the right of disk k, which are all
intact. Now block {0, j} is reconstructed using the parity in block h(0).
Suppose that in the (t – 1)th iteration, we can reconstruct blocks {t – 1, i}, {t – 1, k} and {t
– 1, j}. Then, we can reconstruct blocks {t, i}, {t, k} and {t, j} in the tth iteration as follows. A
data block needed to reconstruct {t, i} is of the form {t’, i’} where t’ < t if i’ > i, and t’ > t if i’ <
i. Now if i’ < i then {t’, i’} must be intact since j and k are both greater than i. On the other hand,
if i’ > i then {t’, i’} must be intact if i’ ≠ j and i’ ≠ k. Now, if i’ = j or i’ = k, {t’, i’} would have
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been already reconstructed since, by assumption, we have reconstructed all blocks {t’, j} and {t’,
k} for t’ ≤ t – 1. Finally, the parity block l(i + t) that is used for reconstructing the block {t, i} is
either located on a disk containing parities only, or is located on a disk with index less than i,
which are both intact by assumption.
Similarly, a data block needed to reconstruct {t, k} is of the form {t’, k’} where t’ < t if k’
< k, and t’ > t if k’ > k. If k’ > k then {t’, k’} must be intact since i and j are both less than k. On
the other hand, if k’ < k then {t’, k’} must be intact if k’ ≠ i and k’ ≠ j. Now, if k’ = i or k’ = j, {t’,
k’} would have been already reconstructed since, by assumption, we have reconstructed all
blocks {t’, i} and {t’, j} for t’ ≤ t – 1. Finally, the parity block r(i + t) that is used for
reconstructing the block {t, k} is either located on a disk containing parities only, or is located on
a disk with index greater than k, which are both intact by assumption.
Having reconstructed blocks {t, i}, {t, k}, we can reconstruct {t, j} using the parity in
block h(t). Thus we have reconstructed all the desired blocks in iteration t, and thereby shown
that the array can tolerate the failure of any three arbitrary disks.
Using this scheme, the ratio of space used for storing parity in an array of n disks as a
function of m is f (m) 

3m  2n  2
n ( 2  2 n)
. Since n > 1,
. Now, f ' (m) 
3m  2n  2  mn
(3m  2n  2  mn) 2

f ' (m)  0 for all m ≥ 1. Therefore, f(m) is monotonically decreasing in the interval [1, ∞).

3m  2n  2
3

. Hence, f(m) is closest to the optimum value of 3/(n
m 3m  2n  2  mn
n3

Furthermore, lim

+ 3) when m is infinitely large. That is turn implies that parity cannot be rotated to enhance data
throughput, for otherwise, this ratio assumes a relatively larger non-optimal value. For this
reason, this scheme is not attractive in practice.
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Some of the alternatives that may be investigated for the placement of data and parity in
arrays to tolerate three disk failures are the factorization of graphs and hypergraphs such that the
union of any three 1-factors yields a Hamiltonian path.
5.3 Correlating alerts to attacks without compromising systems
As shown earlier, honeypots provide a method for deriving attack graphs without putting
system resources at risk. Honeypots also offer the potential for being used as targets to correlate
alerts with attacks in the manner shown earlier. However, a challenge posed by such an approach
is that, the presence of longer attack paths requires relatively large numbers of honeypots to
ensure that sufficient numbers of correlated alerts are generated corresponding to an attack.
Methods to prune the number of honeypots required for this purpose is an area of future research.
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APPENDIX A: RECONSTRUCTING IN (p – 1) DISK ARRAYS
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Suppose that disks i and j have failed in an array with (p – 1) disks. Then their
reconstruction is achieved in the following manner. Each block {u, v} on disk i is colored u + v
(mod p), and therefore satisfies the equation u + v ≡ 2d (mod p). Now, block {u, v} on disk i can
be reconstructed if, for some vertex w in W, the edge (u, w) is in a near-1-factor whose
corresponding blocks lie on disk j. The edge (u, w) is colored u + w (mod p). Thus, we can start
reconstruction of a block (u, v) on disk i that satisfies u + w (mod p) ≡ 2j (mod p). That is, u ≡ 2j
– w (mod p). Conversely, reconstruction can be started on a block {u, v} on disk j that satisfies u
≡ 2i – w (mod p).
We illustrate the aforementioned idea using the six-disk array shown in Figure 3. This
array was created using W = {6} and the complete graph on p vertices, where p = 7. Now,
suppose that the disks 0 and 1 have failed. Thus, i = 0 and j = 1. Then, the block {u, v} on disk 0
from which reconstruction can be started is the one where u ≡ 2·1 – 6 (mod 7) = 3. This is the
block {3, 4}. Thereafter, each block reconstructed corresponds to the edge that is incident to the
edge corresponding to the previously reconstructed block. Similarly the block {u, v} on disk 1
from which reconstruction can be started is the one where u ≡ 2·0 – 6 (mod 7) = 1. This is the
parity block {1, 1}.
Figure 26 illustrates the pseudo code of the function Repair(disk i, disk j) that repairs
failed disks i and j. This function in turn calls the function Reconstruct(block {u, v}, parity group
v) shown in Figure 27 to reconstruct the data block {u, v} by taking the XOR of all blocks in the
parity group v.
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Repair (disk i, disk j)
{
for d ← i and j do
k←d
u ← 2k – w (mod p)
if (k = i) then
k←j
else
k←i
endif
v ← 2k – u (mod p)
continue ← true
do
Reconstruct(block {u, v}, parity group v)
if (u = v) then
continue ← false
else
if (k = i) then
k←j
else
k←i
endif
u←v
v ← 2k – u (mod p)
endif
while (continue = true)
endfor
}
Figure 26: Repairing two failed disks
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Reconstruct(block {u, v}, parity group v)
{
result ← 0
for disk d ← 0 to (n – 1) do
x ← 2d – v (mod p)
if (x  W) and (x ≠ u) do
result ← result ^ data in block {v, x}
endif
endfor
block {u, v} is assigned result
}
Figure 27: Computing the data in a block from its parity group

Note that, each parity group has (n – 2) data blocks and one parity block, with disk d not
containing any block from parity group v if 2d ≡ v + w (mod p), where w W.
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APPENDIX B: READING FROM FAILED DISKS
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An important function of RAID systems is to provide uninterrupted access to data on
failed disks that have not been reconstructed. Hence, a block on which requested data resides
must be reconstructed prior to those without it. Now, the preceding algorithm reconstructs two
failed disks in two iterations of the outermost for-loop, where the disk index d assumes the
values i and j, without constraints on their order. Each iteration reconstructs the data blocks
corresponding to the edges of a path terminating with a self-loop. However, the order in which k
assumes the values i and j is important when a data block on a failed disk has to be reconstructed
to enable its contents to be read expeditiously. This is because, in an array with (p – 1) disks, the
average number of blocks that have to be reconstructed in an iteration to read a given data block
is (p – 3)/4. That in turn requires (p – 3)2/4 XOR operations on blocks. Hence, for large value of
p, it is desirable to reconstruct a given data block in the first iteration. To this end, the function
FindReconstructionDiskIndex(block {u, v}) given in Figure 28 computes the disk from which to
start reconstruction such that the failed data block {u, v} having the requested data is
reconstructed more quickly. Note that, the function executes at most two iterations of the
outermost while loop. Without loss of generality, if the value returned is i, then the first block
reconstructed is {2i – w (mod p), 2j – (2i – w) (mod p)}.
In practice, data is requested from blocks corresponding to the edges on both paths.
However the order and frequency with which data is requested from a block may be utilized to
prioritize it.
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FindReconstructionDiskIndex(block {u, v}, disk i, disk j)
{
found ← false
d←i
while (found = false) do
k←d
x ← 2k – w (mod p)
if (k = i) then
k←j
else
k←i
endif
y ← 2k – x (mod p)
continue ← true
do
if (u = x) and (v = y) then
continue ← false
found ← true
else
if (u = v) then
continue ← false
else
if (k = i) then
k←j
else
k←i
endif
x←y
y ← 2k – x (mod p)
endif
while (continue = true)
if (found = true) then
return d
else
d←j
endif
endwhile
}
Figure 28: Finding the smallest reconstruction sequence.
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